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RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

In the Cuurt of Appeals, Charleston, South Carolina,Febiruary6,
1860.
FOGARTIES AND STILLMAN VS. TUIE STATE BANK.
DAVID A. AMBLER VS. THE SAME.
1. A check drawn on a bank by a depositor who has funds therein is to be 1egarded
in law as it is in commercial usage, as a transfer to the payee or his assignee of
the funds drawn for, and entitles the legal holder, upon presentation and refusal,
to maintain an action against the bauk, whether that holder be the depositor or
a stranger.
2. The contract between the bank and its depositor is, that the former will honor
the drafts or checks of the latter, whenever the latter draws upon funds actually
on deposit at the time when such check or draft is presented, and pay the same
to the depositor himself or his assignee. O'NEALL, Oh. J. dissenting.

The facts fully appear in the opinion of the court, which was delivered by
JOHNSO N, J.-Edward W. Bancroft having deposited money in
the State Bank, drew, in favor of these plaintiffs, severally, checks
for portions of his deposits ; and payment being refused by the
Bank, suits were brought against it by the plaintiffs. The Circuit
Court having decided against their right to recover, this court is
moved, by way of appeal, to reverse that judgment. The two
appeals have been pift on the same footing, and argued together,
and are now to be decided by us.
The court is not insensible to the unusual importance of the
points involved; and, so far as its ability extends, has bestowed
upon them a corresponding attention and consideration.
The question, whether a depositor's check, drawn upon his funds
actually in bank, entitles the holder, upon presentation, to maintain
suit against the bank, has not hitherto been brought directly before
our courts; nor are we aware of but one single decision upon it,
either in this country or abroad. In the case of the National
Bank vs. Eliot Bank, noticed in one of the law periodicals,
(5 Amer. Law Register, 711,) this question was decided in the
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negative, but not, without a dissent, entitled to much respect; and,
after mature reflection, our own persuasion is, that a contrary decision
would have been better upheld by principle, and by sound commercial usage and policy.
In the best conducted banking institutions the well recognized
usage is this: when a customer deposits funds, the bank is understood to receive them with a tacit engagement to pay them out to
his order, or check drawn in his own favor, or in favor of third persons, with whom he may have dealings. This is understood to be
the bank's duty and engagement, incurred by the simple act of
receiving the deposits as a consideration for its right to employ the
money, and which it is to perform, upon the single condition of
being notified of the existdnce of the check, in such manner as to
free it from danger of being made liable to pay the same amount
twice-that is to say, the checks take precedence according to the
order of the notification.
In addition to the obligation arising from this mercantile usage,
forming part of the law of the land, and of which courts are bound
to take notice, the charter of the defendant bank declares that it
"shall receive money on deposit, and pay away the same to order,
free of expense ;" which direction must be construed in the light of
the custom, or habit, and to mean that the bank shall pay to the
depositor's -order, not only when drawn in his own favor, but also
when made payable to third persons.
Banks, by going into business, are understood to hold themselves
out as having undertaken, and assumed upon themselves to be liable
for, all that the business, in commercial usage, obliges them to do;
and when they accept charters, their acceptance must be regarded
as an undertaking to do what the charter commands; so that we
are here presented, in a single view, with the scope of this defendant's duty, both krom custom and charter, andat the same time with
its own promise to do it.
This bank may, therefore, be considered to have promised Bancroft, when it obtained the custody of his money, that it would
honor his checks by paying out the fund, either to -himself or to
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other persons, as his checks might direct. When a draft under
these circumstances comes to the bank, it comes as its own contract,
Wade by it on the consideration of having received funds as the
means of its fulfilment, and, as between the bank and the holder of
the check, (when drawn to a third person,) Bancroft is really the
bank agent, empowered to give the order. The contract presented
is the original personal promise of the bank itself.
These dealings in bank checks stand upon peculiar grounds. The
exigencies of trade do not admit of the delays attending the process of acceptance, or arising from the efflux of days of grace. If
these drafts are delayed, if the bank, being in funds, be at liberty
to refuse payment, the inevitable consequence to the parties disappointed, can be none other than such, as the want of scrupulous
punctuality always inflicts. The drawer's credit suffers; and it is
well known that for this injury a depositor is entitled to his action
against the Bank.
We do not hear of a right of action on the part of the holder;
but is not this very fact some incidental proof that his right is to
the money contained in the draft, and that his right of action is for
the money, and not for special damages for its non-payment.
But in contemplating the consequences of the Bank's violation of
its general duty, the disappointment of the holder is not be overlooked, though no special action lie for it, and he be left, as in other
cases, to an action for the debt due him.
The holder is certainly affected; the whole commercial community, and every interest dependent on commerce, (and that is every
interest in the civilized world,) is affected. These instruments pass
daily from hand to hand, and perform good service in exchanges
and settlements. The public confidence in them is of a two-fold
nature. It is, first, in the drawer. Is he of known character?
One who habitually draws only upon real resources ? It is based,
again, upon the certainty of bank usage.- It is a fixed rule of
trade, that when in possession of a drawer's funds, the Bank will,
o,, no accoun.t, permit itself to withhold payment, if properly notilied. Thee. two things being fixed in the public mind, universal,
,miloubtin. c.nifidence o:)ainis.
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As to the character of the depositor, men must judge of that for
themselves. But as to the punctuality of banks, destroy it, and
who shall calculate the consequences? It is for this reason that,
when their duty is ascertained, it is the duty of judicial tribunals to
hold them to the exact and unvarying per.formance of it.
Now, having described the duty of the defendant Bank, both
under the lex mereatoriaand under its charter, the question recurs
whether the plaintiffs, holding and presenting checks drawn by the
depositor on his funds actually in bank, were entitled to recover the
money which the bank refused to pay.
It is hardly necessary to observe, that the money, when the order
was drawn, belonged, of strict right, to Bancroft, the depositor;
and bad he demanded it, to himself, the bank bad no right to withhold it from him. It was his property, and had he, on refusal to
pay it to him, brought suit, it would have been incompetent for the
bank to set off demands not yet due against his claim. This is plain
and familiar law.
It is not intended to go beyond the case, and say whether, if at
the time of the order, Bancroft's debts had been due, they might
have been set off or not, either against himself or the holder of his
check. The case requires no such speculative decision. What I
intend to assert is, that demands yet to mature were not set off
either against Bancroft or his assignee. In reference to notes discounted by him in bank, the dependence of the bank was not upon
his deposits; it was under no necessity, and had no right, to count
for its security upon the deposits. Its calculations should have
been on the endorsements of his notes, and it should have taken care
that this security was good.
To return from this digression. Instead of drawing in his own
favor, this depositor drew in favor of the plaintiffs. That is to say,
he assigned to them such portion of the deposits as he deemed fit.
It is not perceived upon what.principle the justice of the plaintiff's
claim to the thing assigned can be disputed.
I do not understand, indeed, that it is its justice that is contested.
Nor, strictly, is it their legal right to the fund which is denied.
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The thing disputed is its enforceability. The law is reproached
with the doubt, whether its technical rules.do not interpose obstacles to the remedy which the right seems to require.
It is supposed that there is a want of privity between the bank
and the holders of these checks, which screens it from suit; that
such privity is not established until the bank, over and above all
that it has done, shall have assumed payment to the holders. I
apprehend this is a misconception and an unnecessary disparagement of the law. Itis enough if it appears that ex equo et bono,
the plaintiffs are entitled, as between the parties to the suit and
to the instrument, to the money. If so, an action lies for money
had and received to their use.
I have said that an action might have been brought by Bancroft,
against the bank, for the injury done his credit by refusing his
check. And what does this prove but that (in a single breath) the
refusal was wrong? Wrong to the plaintiffs, wrong to Bancroft,
wrong on the part of the bank. An act, -which it was illegal to do,
contrary to right. Can less be made of this than that the plaintiffs
were ex equo entitled to the money ?
I refer to a passage in Dunlop vs. Silver, (1 Cranch 440-3, Appendix A,) too long to be brought out here, in which there is an
enumeration of cases in which the action for money had and received
applies ; and among them cases of a fictitious payee of a bill of exchange, where it was conceded there was a want of privity, yet the
plaintiffs recovered in this form of action, and actions against
stake-holders on the determination of wagers, when there was no
higher privity than exists in this case; and when Lord Holt observed such was the mutability of the right, that the right to the
money was altered by the cast of a die.
In these cases, there are counts for money had and received to
the plaintiffs' use. Had there been an omission to insert them, the
declarations might have been amended.
But as it is unquestionable, that on the money counts, the checks
might have been given in evidence, that of itself, in my humble
opinion, would have authorized a recovery on counts on the checks
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themselves, had there been no others. For can it be vicious pleading to state, in a special way, the facts under cover of which you
may recover on the general counts ?
I now proceed to consider the plaintiffs' right to this money,
under the form of contract which was adopted, relinquishing all advantages arising from the doctrine ex equo et bono. I think the
bank has made a contract, which, regarded as its own contract,
makes it liable to a legal recovery by the plaintiffs. Wherever-one,
by his own engagement, (and I have shown what this of the bank
is,) promises to pay to the order of another, the person in whose
favor the order is made may enforce the promise. And in the case
of Weston vs. Barker, 12 John. R. 276, where Bowen and Robbins made an assignment to Barker to collect the funds, and, after
paying specified creditors, hold the residue subject to the order of
the assignors; and it was held that Weston, to whom they ordered
this balance to be paid, might maintain an action against Barker
for it, as money received to his use. Mr. Justice Thompson said :
"It was not denied by defendant's counsel, that the action would
be supported, if an express promise to pay" (meaning an express
promise to Weston, such as was contended was necessary to constitute a privity with him) "was proved." . . . "It appears to me,"
says he, "that ihe proof in this case establishes such a promise,
according to the good sense and sound interpretation of the rule."
The defendant "expressly engaged to comply with the condition
mentioned in the letter.". . . "The money has been, in fact, received by the defendant ; and, according to the very terms of his
engagement, was received as the money of the plaintiff, and not as
the money of Bowen and Robbins, they having previously directed
the same to be paid to the plaintiff."... "It was considered," proceeds the judge, "in the argument, that, had the plaintiff been
named in the declaration of trust as one of the persons to be paid,
he could maintain this action. And where, in good sense and sound
principle, can be the difference, whether he was originallynamed
or subsequently designated, according to the terms of the.defendant's undertaking? His express promise was to hold the balance
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subject to the order of Bowen and Robbins. As soon as such order
was given, this promise attached and enured to the benefit of the
person named in such order." And the learned judge goes into an
examination of cases and principles to sustain his conclusion, for
which I refer to his argument.
This case ( Weston vs. Barker)stands upon a principle, that, when
fully understood and appreciated, is sufficient for the case before us;
and it is this, that where one, in consideration of money to come
into his hands, promises to disburse that money as he shall be ordered by him from whom he receives it, he thereby creates a contract, negotiable in its very nature, which puts him in privity with
whomsoever, in the w orld, he may be ordered to make payment to,
so that the promise is, according to the law merchant, made to that
person, and he is bound by his promise to pay him.
This is a principle of inappreciable value; and -when the law,
from its ruder stages, has travelled up to it, it should never be suffered to lapse away again under the lo~d of mere technicalities.
These should be brushed away, where they cease to be helps, and
become mere incumbrances. The principle should be secured to
society.
We have traces of the same principle in every-day life, daily administered in our courts, yet, wonderful to say, not fully perceived.
The learned judge, who dissented in the National Bank vs. Eliot
Bank, points out some of them. Where a party offers a reward
for lost or stolen goods, what obliges him to pay the restorer of his
property but this very principle ? Should he turn round and deny
privity with him because he did not prophetically name him before,
or make an assumpsit to him after he ascertained him, would the
courts let him escape? No. And yet the only difference, in principle, between his case and that of Barker, is, that his promise is
founded upon the consideration of recovering his own property, and
Barker's upon that of getting possession of the property of other
persons. Both are to persons unascertained when the promise was
made.
Whenever a contract is essentially of a circulating nature, going
about, as it were, through society to draw forth the exertions or the
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property of its memberz, as it may encounter them here and there,
on the commercial arena, it carries its own consideration and its own
obligation with it, and forms a privity with the person to whom it
comes.
Long before the Statute of Ann, as is shown in the instructive case of Dunlop vs. Silver, 1 Cranch, R. 367, Appendix A,
the principle I have mentioned, the very principle of this case, was
embedded, as the law merchant, in the laws of England, and was
working its way through the noble chaos of the common law.
Nothing but the sturdiness of Lord HIolt-a mere speck on that
great character-compelled the parliament to put in a statutory
form what was law before. 2 Shower, 161.
It is believed to be incontrovertibly true, that he for whose benefit
a promise is made, may maintain an action upon it, though no consideration, except in a commercial sense, (as I have endeavored to
explain it,) pass from him to the defendant; nor any promise from
the defendant to him. That simple position fully supports, in principle, the present case.
Commercial good, if not commercial necessity, seems to demand
that checks be regarded, as they are, in practice, intended to be,
as transfers of the fund assigned, and not as mere powers to receive
the money.
It is ordered that the non-suit be set aside, and a new trial be
granted.
O'NEALL, C. J., (dissenting.)-I regret to differ with my brethren
in these cases; but I think they have come to a conclusion which
lacks the warrant of law to sustain it. Therefore, I am bound respectfully to dissent, and express my concurrence in the ruling of
the judge below.
The various grounds of the plaintiff's motion may be all placed
under the question : whether the holder of a bank check can maintain an action against the bank, if it refuses payment ? In such a
state of things, I do not perceive how the right of action arises. The
bank charter, it is true, provides "that they shall receiv6 money
on deposit, and pay away the same to order, free of expense." This
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7ives a right of action to the depositor. He can say very truly,
in an action, if the bank fails to pay his checks, "you have violated
your duty to me. I deposited with you upon the faith that you
would pay away the same to my order. Having failed to do this, I
claim damages :" and the court would be bound to sustain his action.
This right of action was fully sustained on the general obligation
resting on a banker, without any such liability arising out of a
charter, in the case of Marzetti vs. Williams and others, even
where there was no damage. 20 Eng. Com. L. R. 412. In Rolin
and another vs. Steward, public officer of the East of England
Bank, 73 Eng. Com. Law Reports 593, it was held, that substantial damages may be recovered against a banker for dishonoring an
acceptance, and checks of a customer, there being sufficient in his
hands to meet them. In Brodie vs. The Farmers and Exchange
Bank, tried before me here, a depositor sued the bank for dishonoring his checks, and recovered a large verdict, which was appealed
from, but the appeal never was brought before the Law Court of
Appeals.
The right of action existing on the part of the depositor how can
the holder of a check have a similar right?
To sustain assumpsit, there must be privity of contract. What
privity can there be between the holder and the bank? I cannot
perceive any. He takes the check on.the credit of the drawer.
Legally, we suppose, the depositor says, "I have funds in the
State Bank, and will give you a check for my debt to you." When
this is accepted by the holder, on whose credit does he take it ?
unquestionably, on the credit of the drawer. He believes, if his
statement be true, he will receive the amount from the bank. But
so far the bank has nothing to do with the transaction. When the
holder presents the check, and the bank refuses payment, against
whom has he the right of action; clearly it seems 'to me against
him from whom he received it.
It is very true, when A receives money from 0 for the use of
B, the latter may recover it, for the consideration is quite sufficient
to maintain the promise implied by law. The money in such case
ex equo et bono is the money of B, and A has agreed so to hold it.
26
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But that is not the case here. The money in bank to the credit
of the depositor is his money, and no one has the right to claim it,
until by order he directs the bank, as his agent, to pay it to another. If the bank refuses to pay it, how can that person to whom
be has appointed payment claim it in an action against the bank ?
He cannot found his action upon the check without an acceptance.
Most of the cases relied upon, proceed upon the notion that there
is enough to make it be regarded as so much had and received to
the plaintiff's use, as in Weston vs. Barker, 12 Johnson's R., 276,
where A assigned securities to B in trust, to dispose of part of the
money thereon received to certain purposes, and to hold the l5alance
subject to the order of A, which trust B accepted, and A then
directed B to pay the balance to C; B afterwards collected the
fund, and it was held that 0 could recover. That case, it will
be' seen, goes not upon the order, but upon the notion that the
money was in the defendant's hands to the use of the plaintiff.
This, I admit, was ingeniously argued and put by Thompson, C. J.
I think, however, his reasoning was met and its fallacy shown by
Spencer, J., in his dissenting opinion, in which he shows that the
promise to hold subject to the order of A, was, in fact and law, a
promise to A, and an action for its breach lay at his instance, and
not at the instance of C. Any other holding would seem to make
the choses in action assignable.
In KYendrik vs. Campbell and Clark, 1 Bail. 522, the action was
on a bill of exchange drawn on them by Elms.
The defendants
had, in writing, before the bill was drawn, engaged that they would
accept it. This letter was shown by Elms to Kendrick, whereupon
he purchased the bill, and the court held that this was an acceptance, and the action was maintained on that strange, and, as I conceive, far-fetched notion. It is true, as my venerated brother
Johnson said, there was "a promise to accept ;" but to whom was
it made ? To Elms, and not to Kendrick, and could impose no
legal obligation in his favor~f But that case cannot help the plaintiff here. The action on the check has nothing to sustain the notion
of acceptance. If it was the ease, I could understand that the
plaintiff, claiming the duty of the defendant under the charter to
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pay the check, and failing to do this, that he might 'laim damages
2 ossiby for this neglect of duty. But in an action of assumpsit,
how he can recover I do not perceive.
The case of Porter, assignee of .Staats Pox vs. The Planters'and

lechanics' Bank, 7 Rich. 134, was sustained on the ground that the
plaintiff had purchased from the agent of the bank a draft on it,
and was therefore, entitled to have his money back, if the bank
choose not to pay the draft.
Unless in law there is foundation for an implied contract, the
plaintiffs have nothing upon which they can stand. There is no
such foundation, for the contract is express with' the depositor, and
there cannot be both an express and an implied contract. The
holder of the check cannot sue on the deposit. That gives right
of action to thq depositor,.and as we have seen, he may sue and
recover.
It seems to me that there is no right of action, and I make no
inquiry as to what may be the notions of bankers, or their customers. If they think a different course from that which I have
pointed out best subserves the purposes of business, they have only
to pursue it, and not ask the aid of the law. If they think my conclusion is right, then I can only say I regret that hereafter we shall
be governed by a different rule.

In the qupreme Court of Michigan, October Term, 1859.
THE PEOPLE vs. WILLIAM TYLER.

1. Upon the high seas every vessel, public and private, is, for jurisdictional purposes, a part'of the territory of the nation where it belongs; and an offence coimmitted on board of it is an offence against the sovereignty of that nation. But,
where a private ship enters a foreign jurisdiction, it be'comes, with all on board,
in the absence of treaty stipulations to the contray, subject to -the municipal
laws and control of the country it visits.
2. W en a Legislature, out of abundant caution, enumerates a great number o
possible places, and punishes crimes committed in any of them, there is no rule of
construction which requires the law to be regarded as an assertion that there are
such places within the jurisdiction. It does not, therefore, necessarily follow,
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because Congress in the Crimes Act of 1857 provided for the punishment of
offences upon bays, creeks, havens and rivers, not within States nor forming a
part of the high seas, that the existence of such within the admiralty jurisdiction
must be assumed.
3. The said act of 1857 being amendatory and supplementary to other acts of identical extent, commencing in 1790, it is not to be supposed that it was intended to
use these terms in different senses at the different periods. And, as there were
at the date of the first act navigable waters open from the ocean, not admitted to
have been within the exclusive jurisdiction of any particular State, and as, upon
the Pacific coast, we have still some waters of this description, there is no necessity to go beyond our own territory to satisfy the terms of the act. And the jurisdiction referred to, by the language used, being a local one, referring to
fixed natural locality, and not satisfied by a vessel, the claim of jurisdiction should
not be extended into foreign parts, unless such an intention is clearly expressed
in the act.
4. As the States lying upon the lakes and their connecting waters extend to the
-national boundary, and their jurisdiction is co-extensive with their territory and
legislative power, the said Crimes Act of 1857, if it applies at all to these waters,
canonly take effect within the United States, and within British waters.
5. As a general principle, the criminal laws of no nation can operate beyond its
territorial limits, and to give any government or its judicial tribunals the right to
punish any act or transaction as a crime, it must have occurred within those
limits. The exceptions to this rule relate to crimes which are peculiarly injurious to the rights or interests of the nation or of its subjects, and which, if committed by its citizens or subjects, may be punished wherever committed; as in
the case of treason committed abroad, or criminal acts on the part of the crews
or passengers of its ships in a foreign port, whereby its commerce or its pacific
relations with other powers would be endangered. But theseexceptions to the
general rule of the locality of crimes are never understood to be included in the
general provisions of criminal statutes, but require to be specifically mentioned
and defined.
6. The territory of a state or nation includes, as a part of its domain, the lakes and
rivers which lie within its limits. And these waters being thus susceptible of appropriation as territory in the same way as the land, are in like manner capable
of division, by which a part may be appropriated by one adjoining nation and a
part by another; and when so divided, the part belonging to each nation is as
completely a part of its territory as the whole lake or river, if wholly within its
limits.
7. The United States and Great Britain having in this manner, by the treaty of
1783, divided and appropriated the lakes and their connecting waters, the courts
of neither, while this treaty remains in force, can for jurisdictional purposes, and
especially for criminal jurisdiction, consider the portion of these waters within
the limits of the other, as differing in any respect from the lands. The treaty of
1842, conceding to the vessels, &c., of both nations a right of passage through
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the channels and passages thus appropriated, does not deprive either of that
complete and exclusive jurisdiction over that part of the lakes and rivers on its
side the line which any nation may exercise upon land within its acknowledged
limits.
8. The said Crimes Act of 1857 was not understood or intended by Congress to extend to any waters not essentially maritime; much less to a river in the interior
of the continent, not navigable from the ocean ; and least of all to a portion of
that river within the territory and exclusive jurisdiction of a foreign sovereignty.
9. Nor was the said Crimes Act of 1857 intended to go beyond the class of assaults
made manslaughter under the former statutes to which it was amendatory and
supplementary; or to do more than provide for the case of death on land, resulting from assaults which were already made punishable when death resulted at
the place where the fatal blow was given.
10. And, therefore, manslaughter committed by a mortal blow given on the river
St. Clair, beyond the boundary line between the United States and the province
of Canada, and within a county in said province, from which blow death ensued
on land, is not within the intent and meaning of the said act, though the blow
was given on an American vessel.
11. The subject of admirality jurisdiction over the lakes and naviagable waters connecting them, considered, and the case of the Genesee Chief (12 How. 448) commented on, per Chrihtiancy J.
12. The admiralty jurisdiction over the said lakes and navigable waters.connecting
them, and the constitutional validity of the act of Congress of February 25th,
1845, relating to the same, considered and denied, per Manning 3.

Case reserved from St. Clair. Circuit.
CAMPBELL J.-The facts, as set up in the pleadings, show that
Tyler shot Jones on an American vessel on the St. Clair river,
'within the limits of Canada, and that he died of the wound at Port
Huron, on land, within the county of St. Clair, in this State. The
questi6n presented for our consideration is, whether Tyler's offence
came within the United States laws, and within the jurisdiction of
the United States Circuit Court.
It is much to be regretted that this question was not presented to
the consideration of the Circuit Court of the United States, where
the trial was had. It is fairly raised here upon the issue of a
former conviction, and the very able arguments we have listened to
have exhausted the subject.
Homicide has always been treated as an offence depending on
locality, and it is so regarded by the act of Congress under which
Tyler was indicted. Where death does not immediately follow the
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n;..)rtal blow, and happens in another jurisdiction within the realm,
the place of death was generally, under the views taken by the
common law authorities, the proper place of jurisdiction; inasmuch
as the crime was not complete without it. There is some doubt
whether, at the common law, originally such offences were provided
for at all. But, as the blow itself may be made a punishable assault, there is no very good reason for not allowing it to be punisbed as an assault, qualified by its natural and legitimate consequences.-1 Bish. Cr. L. §§ 554, 555. This is the plain design of
the act of Congress, which punishes an assault upon the water,
when death ensues upon land either within or without the United
States. There are a very few places in the United States where
a crime of violence would come within the Federal jurisdiction. In
this case the place of death being within the State jurisdiction, the
authority of Congress to punish the assault could only be deduced
from a jurisdiction existing where the assault was committed. And,
inasmuch as under our treaties with Great Britain the place was
under the exclusive territorial jurisdiction of that country, the case
presents the question whether, under this act of Congress, a person
who commits the offence charged within a foreign jurisdiction, is
made punishable here.
Upon the high seas, every vessel, public or private, is for jurisdictional purposes, a part of the territory of the nation of its owners.
An offence committed on board of such vessel, is an offence against
the sovereignty of that nation. But, when a private ship enters a
foreign jurisdiction, it becomes at once, with all on board (in the
absence of treaty stipulations to the contrary,) subject to the municipal laws and control of the country it visits-The Schooner -Exchange vs. Mc.Fadden, 7 Cranch, 116. Any crime committed
there may be punished by the local laws. The:right to enter upon
and navigate the waters of any country, is subject in all cases to
the condition of temporary obedience to its laws. And, if the laws
of Canada made provisions for the punishment of such an assault as
the one under consideration, no doubt Tyler, if found there, would
have been properly amenable to those laws-whether amenable to
our laws or not.
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The matter to be investigated- resolves itself into the inquiry
whether the act of Congress, under which the trial was had in the
United States court, is, upon fair rules of construction, intendcd to
cover just such a case as this. If the case falls within it, an inquiry
may then arise into its constitutional validity.
By the words of the statute, if taken literally, and without quali"fication, every person, of whatever nationality, who, upon the waters
mentioned in the act, whether in a vessel or not, commits an assault
without malice upon any other person, of whatever nationality, and
whether in or out of a vessel, of which the assaulted person dies on
land, within or without the United States, is guilty of manslaughter,
and punishable in the Federal courts.
SNo one would contend for a moment that the act should be so
broadly construed. It would occur- at once that there are several
classes of objbctions to such a construction. It is obvious that Congress could by no possibility have power in all these cases. It is
also plain that, if' any of these places are off the high seas, some
provisions which might be valid on the high seas, would not be so
elsewhere. And it is further manifest that, whether on or off the
seas, the citizenship of the parties might become an important element in the inquiry. Other difficulties might arise, which it is unnecessary to refer to more particularly.
It is undoubtedly true that every word which goes to the description of an offence, or the circumstances under which it is punishable, must be regarded; or, in other words, that no one can be
held liable unless he comes within all the particulars of the offence
described. But there is no rule of construction which requires,
when a legislature, out of abundant caution, enumerates a great
variety of possible places, and punishes crimes committed in any of
them, that the law must be regarded as an assertion that there are
such places within the jurisdiction. And it does not, therefore,
follow, .because Congress has provided for the punishment of offences
upon bays, creeks, havens, and rivers not within states, nor forming
a part of the high seas, that we mu~t assume the existence of such
within the admiralty jurisdiction-much lessthat Congress intended
to include within that list all the navigable waters on the globe

THE PEOPLE vs. TYLER.

without the United States. And there is no principle which would
include Canadian waters that would not require this unlimited construction.
The phrases describing the waters named in this act of Congress,
are substantially borrowed from English statutes relating to the admiralty. Under those statutes, the havens, bays, &c., named, were
all understood to be within the realm, and opening from the sea,
although, by the prevailing authority, their enumeration was nugatory; for, according to many cases, none were in fact within the
admiralty jurisdiction. The decisions on this point were not uniform. In the conflict of opinion on the extent of admiralty juris-'
diction, it was wise to include such places in any general act; and
yet their inclusion, as qualified, could not be regarded as corroborating the admiralty claim. In borrowing phrases from old statutes,
it is usually deemed proper to take them as construed. If this be
done, the statute before us is satisfied without departing from the
republic. If there are such waters as are there described within
the republic, and not within States, they are included. If there
are no such waters in the country, still the act is not impaired, but
is only applicable, as in England, to the high seas.
This act was passed in 1857, but it is amendatory and supplementary to other acts, of identical extent, as old as 1790. And it
is not to be supposed that it was meant to use language in any different senses at the different periods. A reference to the condition
of things existing when the Constitution was adopted, as well as subsequently, will show that, whatever may have been the real state of
the case, there were, in more than one locality navigable -waters
open from the ocean, and not admitted to have been within the exclusive jurisdiction of any particular State. Such seems to have
been the case with Delaware bay (see 1 Kent Com. 29,) and even
the Delaware river was held in Pennsylvania,: in Montgomery vs.
.Henry, 1 Dal]. 50, not to be within the body of any county. The
same difficulties existed in New York bay and the lower part of
HudsQn river, which, in 1808, were the source of serious controversies between New York and New Jersey. N. Y. Rev. L. of 1813,
vol. 1, p. 238. It was not until 1834 that the controversy was
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settled; and now each State has the right to serve process over all
of the lower wafers, while the jurisdiction and property are parcelled
out in a very different manner from that usually adopted by neighboring States. 3 N. Y. Rev: Stat. p. 175. There were also
waters opening into the Gulf of Mexico which were within territories; and the subsequent acquisition of Louisiana and Florida continued this state of things up to the admission of Florida into the
Union. Upon the Pacific coast, we have still some waters of this
description. There is, therefore, no necessity to go beyond our own
territory to satisfy the act. And the jurisdiction referred to, by the
language used, being a local one, referring (as was held in United
States vs. Bevans, 8 Wheat. 336) to a fixed natural locality, and
not satisfied by a vessel, even although that vessel was a public
man-of-war, we ought not to extend a claim of criminal jurisdiction
into foreign ports, unless such an intention is very clearly expressed.
Whether, apart from the jurisdiction over commerce, any such
prerogative exists over citizens as to authorize us, as is done in England, to take cognizance of their offences wheresoever committed, or
whether, if possessed, it is vested in the individual States, which
have exclusive supervision of all ordinary transactions at home, or in
the Federal government, which at home has no concern with such
acts, is an interesting inquiry, but entirely unnecessary for the purposes of this case. No case is reported in which jurisdiction over
the delinquencies of absent citizens has been *exercised by the
United States courts on any such ground. And I have discovered
no act of Congress which purports to provide for such cases. The
offences committed out of the country, which are made punishable
(except military delinquencies, and correspondence with foreign
powers, and possibly treasons) are all confined to the waters.
The power to define and punish piracies, and felonies upon the
high seas, and offences against the law of nations, is given by the
Constitution in the broadest terms. The Crimes Act of 1790 uses
as broad language as the act before us, namely: "If any person
or persons shall commit, upon the high seas, or in any river, haven,
basin, or bay, out of the jurisdiction of any particularState," .&c.
1 L. U. S. p. 113. And the language thus used was not qualified
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by the phrase which is found in the acts of 1825 and 1857, "within
the admiralty jurisdictionof the United States." The act literally
reached "any person" who might commit the offences charged in
any navigable waters. Murder and robbery committed there were
declared to be piracy, as murder and robbery on the sea were piracy at common law. In the case of the United States vs. Palmer,
8 Wheat. 610, it was expressly held. that robbery committed on the
high seas by American citizens, upon a foreign ship, did not come
within the intent of the act, although the language of the act was
broad enough to cover suoh a case, and it was also within the
power of Congress. This ruling was based upon the doctrine that
the law was only intended to punish crimes against the United
States; and a crime committed on board of a foreign ship on the
high seas, or upon a foreigner, not on an American ship, was no
offence against the United States, because not committed within her
jurisdiction. In United States vs. Holmes, 5 Wheat. 412, the same
doctrine was recognized as to vessels having a lawful national
character. In United States vs. Klintock, 5 Wheat. 144, where
the offence charged was alleged to have been committed on a piratical vessel which had no nationality, it was held to come within the
act, because it was an offence against all nations, and of universal
jurisdiction. But the doctrine as to foreign vessels is reiterated in
this language: "Those general terms ought not to be applied
to offences committed against the particular sovereignty of a
foreign power; but we think they ought to be applied to offences committed against all nations, including the United States,
by persons who, by common consent, are equally amenable to the
laws of all nations." In the case of the United States vs. Certain
Pirates,5 Wheat. 184, Johnson J. intimates a doubt whether, in
cases of robbery, which he deems general piracy, the fact that it
was committed on a foreign ship would exempt it from our jurisdiction. He, however, lays it down very clearly that murder on a
foreign ship is no offence against the United States, and in no sense
within her jurisdiction; but he also intimates a doubt whether, if
committed by an American, it may not be reached by reason of his
allegiance. The court, however, has never departed from the doctrine
,in P.17mer's case.
It was held in the Pirates'case that a piratical
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offence, committed on a piratical vessel, was punishable, although
committed within a marine league of the shore of a foreign country,
provided it was upon the high seas ; because the neutral rights allowed in favor of nations over that space of the ocean, render it
neutral to war only, "nd not to crimes. And it is well settled that
the maritime jurisdiction accorded to nations over their contiguous
waters, is not an absolute and -exclusive one, but is subject to the
peaceable use of all parts of the open ocean as a common highway
of nations, but liable to any regulations necessary for the safety
and protection of commercial rights and the fisheries, as well as the
preservation of neutrality. A foreign vessel, upon any part of the
high seas, has been regarded as foreign territory.
In the United States vs. Kessler, -Baldw. 15, the question came
up directly, whether an offence committed on a French vessel, within
a marine league of our coast, was punishable in the Federal courts;
and it was held that such a vessel was foreign territory, and for that
reason a crime committed on her was not- punishable by our laws.
In the United States vs. Davis, 2 Sumn. 482, an American officer
of a vessel, who, while on his own vessel on the high sea, but within
a short distance of the shore of the Society Islands, shot a person
on a vessel belonging to those islands, was held not punishable under
the acts of Congress; and the court regarded the offence as exclusively punishable by the local authorities. The decision was given
by Judge Story, who drew the Crimes Act of 1825, and whose inclination was generally in favor of giving a liberal extension to the
Federal jurisdiction. This decision is in accordance with Palmer's
case.
Every principle which takes out of the operation of the acts of
Congress crimes committed by Americans on foreign vessels on the
high seas, applies with greater force to offences committed within the
acknowledged and fixed territorial limits of a foreign nation, because
it is dependent entirely on the national charqcter of the place of the
offence, and can not, by any sound'treasoning, reach that which is
territory by implication only, and yet be excluded from that which
is actual territory.
This view of the courts is strengthened by the fact, that those
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statutory marine offences which are not confined to place, are all
mutinous offences, committed on board of American vessels by their
crews. The only case expressly provided for in foreign waters, is
where offences are committed by persons belonging, as passengers
or crew, on board of American vessels, on others occupying similar
relations to the same ship, and committed on the ship (see §5 of aet
of 1825.) And, even in that case which is plainly within the power
to regulate foreign commerce, it is expressly provided that if the
offence be punished by the local authorities, such punishment shall be
a bar to further proceedings in this country. This act shows that
it could never have been intended to regard offences committed
abroad, as offences against the United States, merely because committed by American citizens, or on American vessels, unless some
other element entered into the account.
It is further worthy of consideration whether the mischief of the
old law is not to be regarded, as in great measure, the occasion,
of the new. The act of 1790 punished manslaughter only when
committed on the high seas. In the case of the United States vs.
Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, it was decided that, under that act, manslaughter committed on an American ship near Whampoa, in a river
navigable from the ocean, was not punishable. That decision was
made in 1820. A revision of the Crimes Act was made in 1825,
and yet it was not considered necessary to make any new law on
the subject. As Whampoa was then without the jurisdiction of any
country which had recognized the general law of nations, there was
certainly strong occasion for a change, unless the policy of this
country had been regarded as fairly expressed in Palmer's case.
And, if the British portion of St. Clair river is within the purview
of the act of 1857, we shall have presented the singular anomaly,
of an assault which constitutes a crime if followed by death on land,
either within or without the United States, and yet is no crime or
offence whatever if followed by death on the spot. The act of 1857
was occasioiied by the result of a trial before Judge Curtis for a
fatal assault committed on the high seas, and which would have
amounted to manslaughter, under the old statute, if the wounded
man had not survived long enough to be landed. United States

THE PEOPLE vs. TYLER.

vs. Armstrong 2 Curt. C. C. 451. The bill was introduced by Mr.
Fessenden, who made this statement on its introduction; and it
passed without any examination or debate. There is no reason to
suppose its intention was to go beyond.the class of assaults made
manslaughter under the former statute, or to do more than provide
for the cases of death on land resulting from attacks which already
were punishable where death occurred at the place where the fatal
blow was given. If designed-to go further, it creates a new casum
omissum by no means less formidable than the one it was meant to
supply. I am very strongly inclined to the opinion that, even i f
the other statutes had received no construction, the effect of this,
as an amendatory act, should be confined to the high seas. But,
be this as it may, I have no doubt whatever .that it cannot be extended to cover an assault made in a foreign country, unless made
by one of a ship's company or passengers upon another of the inhabitants of the ship.
These considerations would, to my mind, be sufficient to dispose
of the case before us, without regard to the views that have been
presented to us as applicable to these particular waters. Although
they are navigable, and actually used for commerce of a maritime
nature, which, when foreign, or between different States, may, perhaps, be open, under the legislation of Congress, to the forms of
admiralty remedies where the option of a jury trial is allowed, yet
every portion of the lakes and their connecting waters is the exclusive property of Great Britain, or some American State. And the
Supreme Court of the United States has recently decided that upon
these waters, as upon the internal tide-waters of the States, the jurisdiction of the admiralty is not local and territorial, but is transitory, and attaches only to such commerce as has been, by the Con-stitution of the United States, submitted to the control of Congress
(Allen vs. Newberry 21 How. 244 ; and Maguire vs. Card, Id, 248.)
There is no construction of the act of 1857 which, under any theory
of jurisdiction, could extend it to offences committed on the lakes,
for they come within none of the terms used; and it would be a
very forced construction which should apply the statute to their
connecting waters.
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'Without expressing any opinion upon the power of

Congress to

punish such an offence as Tyler's, I am entirely satisfied that no act
of Congress now in force can be fairly construed to embrace it. I
am therefore of opinion that the case was not within the jurisdiction
of the Circuit Court of the United States for this district, and was
not within the intent of the act of 1857.
Both questions reserved should be answered in the negative.
Opinion, orally delivered, by
Cir. J.-urisdiction is co-extensive with the territorial
limits of the government exercising it. Admiralty jurisdiction is
that which a nation exercises beyond its territorial limits, and upon
the high seas. This is exercised because these seas are the peculiar
pr6perty of no nation, but a common highway for all; and is properly
exclusively confined to cases of civil jurisprudence. The United
States has never conferred upon its admiralty courts criminal jurisdiction. It is true.that criminal jurisdiction over certain specified
offences is conferred by Congress upon the courts exercising admiralty jurisdiction, but such jurisdiction is never administered under
the admiralty code, but after the course of the common law.
In England, at the time of our revolution, and for a long time
prior, no power existed in the courts of admiralty to try and punish
for crime. This power was conferred upon a commission which proceeded under the common law. Thus the right of trial by jury, and
of being confronted by witnesses, was secured to persons charged
with the commission of offences upon the high seas, as well as to
those charged with their commission upon land. This common law
was brought to this country by our ancestors, and at the time of the
revolution, and the formation of our federal government, was the
law of every colony. The objections which had prevailed in England
to the trial of those charged with crime, under the admiralty code,
whereby the right of trial by jury was refused, and which ultimately
led to the withdrawal of this jurisdiction from the admiralty courts,
equally prevailed here ; and, when the framers of the constitution
inserted in it the clause conferring admiralty and maritime jurisdiction upon the Federal judiciary, they conferred such only as existed
MARTIN,
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in the mother country at the time of the separation. This is manifest from the fact that provision is made in a separate clause of the
constitution for the power to define and punish piracies and felonies
committed on the high seas, and offences against the law of nations,
and in also providing that the trial of all crimes shall be by jury.
had crimes been considered. as embraced within the admiralty jurisdiction, this power would be unnecessary, if not inconsistent with
the provision conferring judicial power ; and certainly the provision
for trial by jury would be wholly inconsistent with the power and
practice of admiralty courts.
If the admiralty courts had no jurisdiction'over crimes committed
on the high seas, what court has, and what is the extent of that
jurisdiction ? Congress, by vrious acts from 1789 to the present
day, has conferred that jurisdiction upon the Circuit and District
Courts of the United States.
Such jurisdiction is confined to the high seas, or other waters out
of the jurisdiction of any particular State.
When, therefore, Congress provides for the punishment of felonies,
if committed within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the
United States, such jurisdiction must be regarded as confined to the
high seas, or, probably, tide-waters in certain instances, as such only
are within the dominion of Congress for such purpose. The constitutional limitation must be considered as incorporated into and as
controlling the act. And Congress, in every or nearly every instance,
has accordingly respected this limitation of power by enacting that
the offences shall have been committed on waters out of the jurisdiction of any State.
The words "admiralty and maritime jurisdiction," as used in the
criminal code, must then be interpreted by the grant of power to
Congress in the constitution, and construed as signifying the high
seas. Whether there be a civil admiralty jurisdiction extending
elsewhere, and on other waters, it is immaterial to inquire.
This leads us to the inquiry, are the waters of the St. Clair River,
which are without the boundaries of the United States, and within
those of Canada, within the admiralty jurisdiction :of the United
States, and without the jurisdiction of any particular State, within

THE PEOPLE vs. TYLER.

the meaning of the Crimes Act? When the constitution was framed,
it cannot, except by the most violent presumption, be presumed that
the lakes and their connecting waters were intended to be embraced
within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States. The term
was employed in the sense it had been for centuries used in the
mother country, and from their first settlement in the colonies, to
designate jurisdiction upon the ocean, that space without the territorial limits of any government, the common highway of all nations.
The lakes, and rivers or straits connecting them, were not presumed
to be of such a character. They were, before the revolution, within
the exclusive dominion of Great Britain, and, by the treaty of peace,
dominion over them was divided. No waste of waters beyond any
territorial jurisdiction, no common highway of nations, ever existed
upon them. By the treaty of 1783, the boundary line between Great
Britain and the United States ran through the centre. They can,
therefore, in no sense, be denominated "high seas" within the meaning of the constitution.
Nor are their waters, which are within the boundaries of the
United States, without the jurisdiction of any particular State.
Each State lying upon their borders is bounded by the national
boundary line. Beyond such line the waters are within an acknowledge foreign jurisdiction, and, so far as I can ascertain, (at least in
this case, as admitted by the pleadings,) within the body of foreign
counties. Under no known rule of admiralty law, then, can they be
regarded as within admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.
Nor were they ever regarded as being within such by Congress,
nor by the courts of the United States, until the decision of the
case of the Genessee Chief vs. Fitzhugh, 12 Howard, 443. If they
had been within this jurisdiction, there was no occasion for the passage of the act of 1845, extending what Judge Conklin very properly
calls a quasi admiralty jurisdiction over them.
This act does not extend full admiralty jurisdiction over them,
nor include them within such jurisdiction. It only extends the
jurisdiction of the District Court over cases of coitract and tort
arising in, upon, or concerning certain classes of boats and vessels
navigating them, to be exercised in the same manner as jurisdiction
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was exercised over contracts and torts upon like vessels navigating
the high seas or tide-waters, within the admiralty and maritime
jurisdictionof the United States, and secures to parties a concurrent remedy at common law, and by the State laws, when competent.
As I understand ii, this act distinctly recognizes the distinction
between these waters and the high seas, and regards them as being
without the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States.
Its language will not admit of a construction which will embrace
them within such jurisdiction. The jurisdiction conferred is likened
to the admiralty, but it is not the full and exclusive admiralty jurisdiction which it extended over them. As it did not exist over the
lakes before the act, Congress had no power to extend it over them.
I am aware that the Supreme Court of the United States, iri the
case of the Genesee Chief, regard this as being an extension of the
admiralty jurisdiction; or rathe'r, as I understand the opinion of
Chief Justice Taney, as a recognition of the existence of such jurisdiction under the Constitution. To my. mind it is certain that
it exists as admiralty jurisdiction by virtue of the' Constitution, or not
at all. Congress cannot extend such jurisdiction over waters not
recognized by the law of nations as the proper subjects of it.' That
law was in the eye of the framers of the Constitution when the provision conferring admiralty and maritime jurisdiction upon the federal courts was incorporated into it, and this includes only the high
seas or tide-waters.
If Congress had the power to pass the act at all, it was under the
power to regulate commerce between the several States. This seems
to have been the aim of Congress, for the act confers jurisdiction only
in cases of contract or tort arising upon vessels "employed in business
of commerce and navigation between ports and places in different
States and Territories." And this appears to be the later view of
that court. See Allen vs. The Fashion, 2 1 How. It was said, in
the argument of the prisoner's counsel, that this court, in Amer.
TransportationCompany vs. Moore, had recognized these waters as
-within the original grant of admiralty jurisdiction, and of like
character with the sea in respect to maritime legislatioa and jurisdiction. In this the counsel is mistaken. No such question was

THE PEOPLE vs. TYLER.

before us, nor did we undertake to determine under what grant such
jurisdiction was exercised. As an exercise of the power to regulate
commerce between the different States, I am still of the opinion that
the civil jurisdiction of the District Court might have been extended
in the manner and with the limitation that it was. If these views
are correct, the Crimes Acts of 1825 and 1857 do not embrace the
offence for which Tyler stands charged, as the offence was not committed on the high seas, or in any arm of the sea, or within any
river, haven, creek; basin or bay within the admiralty jurisdiction
of the United States.
The act of 1857 was additional to that of 1825, and the section
under which Tyler was indicted in the federal court was passed to
supply a casus omissus. The act of 1825, which defined and punished certain crimes committed on "the high seas, or in any arm of
the sea, or in any river, &c., within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States, and out of the jurisdiction of any
particular State," was so passed before any jurisdiction of the federal courts was extended over the lakes or their connecting waters.
This act, then, could not have embraced offences committed upon
these waters: 1st. Because they are not high seas; and, 2d. Because
federal jurisdiction had not been extended by Congress over them.
The act of 1845, extending the jurisdiction of the District Court
over them in certain cases, is confined to civil cases alone, and does
not confer full admiralty jurisdiction. had Congress intended to
extend the Crimes Act over them, it is natural to suppose that such
intention would have been declared. But it did not so intend, for it
had not the power. The act of 1857 defined and provided for the
punishment of another felony, but did not enlarge, or undertake to
enlarge, the jurisdiction of the courts or to confer jurisdiction over
waters not within the act of 1825.
It is to my mind an utter impossibility to extend the provisions
of these acts over the lakes and their connecting waters. They are
operative only within the admiralty jurisdiction of the courts of the
United States. Now, such jurisdiction can exist only on the high
seas, as has already been shown, although a quasi admiralty jurisdiction, for the purpose of regulating and protecting commerce, may
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exist elsewhere. But the Crimes Acts do not confer jurisdiction on
the federal courts co-extensively with that which they have or may
have in civil cases. The offence must be committed "out of'the
jurisdiction of any particular State."
The federal courts have no jurisdiction over crimes committed
in foreign waters with a single exception, viz: when an inhabitant
of an American ship commits a crime against the person or property
of another inhabitant; and then only when the foreign governmefit
disclaims or declines to exercise jurisdiction. This is not such a
case.
Nor have they criminal jurisdiction over the waters of any " particular State."
Now, there are no cowpmon, no unappropriated waters on the line
of the lakes. The boundary line runs through their centre, and
every crime committed upon them is committed within the ju:isdiction of some State or that of Great Britain. Where, then, can a
crime be committed on these waters, within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States, and without that of any particular State ?
I think both questions should be answered in the negative.
NoTE.-The printed report of this case, for a copy of which we are under obligations to T. M. Cooley, Esq., the learned State Reporter, covers one hundred and
thirty-one pages, and will be found in 7 Mich. R. now in press. We present the
opinions of Chief Justice Martin and Mr. Justice Campbell, which really determine
the matter in issue. The opinions of Mr. Justice Christiancy and Mr. Justize Manning cover so many pages that it is impossible to give them. But the student or
reader who wishes to see a complete, and elaborate dissertation on these highly interesting questions should not fail to study both these excellent judicial opinions.
The case was argued by A. Russell, Esq., for the demurrer, and by Attorney General Howard and H. D. Terry, Esq., for the Commonwealth, with marked ability on
both sides, and a copious citation of authorities, English and Amelican, and indeed
the entire learning, on the questions in controversy, will be found collected in the
arguments of the counsel and opinions of the judges, with a degree of fulness not
elsewhere to be met with.--Eds. Am. Law Reg.
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RAILROAD COMPANY vs. CASTER.

.Tn the Supreme Court of Indiana.
THE MICHIGAN SOUTHERN AND NORTHERN RAILROAD COMPANY

vs.

CASTER AND ANOTHER.'

1. Where goods are delivered to a carrier, and they are not transported according
to his undertaking, but are injured or destroyed, the rule of damages is the value
of the goods at the place to which they were to be carried, less the freight.
2. Quere, whether a railroad company receiving goods directed to a point beyond
the terminus of their route, is liable for such damages at the point to which the
goods are directed.

Appeal from the Elkhart Court of Common Pleas.
J. B. Niles, for the appellants. 2
.. Lowry and J. A. Liston, for the appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PERKINS, J.-This was an action commenced by the appellees
against the appellants, in the Elkhart Court of Common Pleas, to
recover the value of a threshing machine, which, it is alleged in the
complaint, Caster and Stutsman delivered to the appellants at Elkhart, Indiana, to be forwarded to Chicago, and there delivered to the

Ihis case will be reported in 13 Ind. 164, not yet published. The sheets of the
volume have been obligingly furnished us in advance of publication.-Ede. Amer.
Law Reg.
2 Extract from Mr. Nilee' brief:
The company only undertook to deliver the machine to a connecting line at Chicago, and their liability beyond that point was expressly limited by the written
c(ntract-the bill of lading. Even without such an express limitation, that, in this
case, would have been the extent of their liability. Ackley vs. Kellogg, 8 Cow. 223;
Pierce on Am. Railr. Law, 451.
It would be unreasonable to hold the company liable for the value of the goods at
Iowa City. If the evidence on which to base the damages in this case was properly
admitted, or if the instruction be correct, then, in case the Boston and Lowell Railroad Company should receive goods in Boston, marked for St. Paul, in Minnesota,
agreeing to carry them to Lowell, and there deliver them to a connecting line, they
would be liable, in case the goods were lost, to pay their full value at St. Paul. In
case of cheap and bulky goods, the value might be double what it would be in Boston or Lowell, and the owner could recover that double value without having paid
any freight or incurred any expenses.
It is the better settled American doctrine, that a carrier receiving goods marked
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next connecting railroad to Iowa City; and which, it is alleged,
was not delivered, but was broken and injured while in the custody
of the appellants.
The answer of the defendants below consisted, first, of a general
denial; and secondly, of a special matter of defence, which it is,
perhaps, not necessary to refer to particularly.
The cause was tried by a jury, and a verdict and judgment were
rendered in favor of the plaintiffs below for four hundred and fifty
dollars and costs.
Instructions to the jury were asked for by the defendants, which
were refused; others were given by the court at the instance of the
plaintiffs. A motion for a new trial was made by the defendants,
and overruled, and evidence on the part of the plaintiffs was permitted to go to the jury against the objections of the defendants. All
the questions arising in the case were reserved by exceptions. The
evidence is all incorporated into the record.
The receipt given by the railroad company, acknowledging the
delivery to them of the threshing machine, expressly limited their
to a particular destination, is bound only to transport to the end of his route, when
he becomes a mere forwarder. St. John vs. Van Santvoord, 25 Wend. 666; Van
Sanivoord vs. St. John, 6 Hill, 158;. .Emore vs. Naugatuck,23 Conn. R.-457; Edw.
on Bail., 504; 1 Pars. on Cont. p. 687, note k.
But in this case, the undertaking being so limited by express contract, it is clear
that no responsibility attaches to the company bey6nd Chicago. It follows, as a
corollary, that the evidence as to the value of the propeity at Iowa City, which was
the only basis for the verdict, was improperly admitted, and the instruction on that
point was erroneous.
It follows, also, that there was no sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict, for
there was nothing from which the jury could ascertain the true measure of damages.
But, again, there was no refusal to deliver these goods, and there was no evidence
of a conversion of them by the company. They were seen at Lapoite in an injured
condition, and they may have been detained on the road for an unreasonable time,
though there is no evidence on that subject. The mere failure to deliver the property at Chicago in a reasonable time, does not male the company liable for its
entire value. Robinson vs. Austin, 2 Gray, 564; Bonlin vs. Nye, 10 Cush. 416;
&covill vs. Grioth, 2 Kern. 509.
When goods are only damaged, the owner is still bound to receive them, and cannot go against the carrier for a total loss. Redf. on Railw., p. 320.
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liability for it to the time when it should be receipted for by the
connecting railroad company at Chicago. The loss of the machine
happened between Elkhart county, Where the appellants received it,
and Chicago, where they were to discharge it. The court charged
the jury thus:
-The general rule, when goods are delivered to a carrier, and
they are not transported according to his undertaking, as to the
amount to be recovered, is the value of the property at the point of
destination; and if, in this case, the machine was to be transported
from Goshen to Iowa City, the obligation of the defendants is, to
transport the same safely and in good order, which was not done;
but on the contrary, the machine was, by the defendants, broken,
injured, or destroyed, and they are liable for such value"-meaning
clearly the value of the machine at Iowa City.
This instruction is wrong. The rule of damages, in such case,
is the value of the goods at the place to which they were to be carried, less the freight. Ind. Dig., p. 889.
Again, the instruction assumes that Iowa City is the place of
destination at which the value of the machine was to be estimated.
We are not clear that, as to the Michigan, &c. Railroad Company,
the defendants below, Chicago was not the place of destination.
Pars6ns, in his Mercantile Law, says the rule in England seems to
be, that if a carrier takes goods marked for a place beyond his own
route, he will be liable for the goods to the place to which they are
marked for delivery; while in the United States, he says, the
weight of authority is, that he will not be liable beyond his own
route without an agreement to that effect. Parsons, supra,pp. 215,
216. See Jenneson vs. The Camden, &c., Railroad Co., 4 Amer.
Law Reg. 284, and note.
But will this principle have any application in determining the rule
for the assessment of damages for a loss happening upon either of
the routes making up the whole line of transportation. This question will be left undecided till it has been argued.
The judgment is reversed, with costs. Cause remanded, &c.
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BANKS VS. WERTS. 1
A contract for the sale of goods on Sunddy is void; but the parties, by subsequ6ntly
acting upon it as a subsisting and valid agreement, may ratify it.

Appeal from the Miami Circuit Court.
N. 0. Ross and R. P. Effinger, for the appellant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
J.-Banks sued Werts to recover a stock of goods in
the Hartpence store-room, in Miami county.
The answer to the complaint admits 'the defendant's possession
of the goods, denies that they belonged to the plaintiff, and alleges
that he, defendant, is the sheriff of said county, and that by virtue
of two executions in his hands, against one Lewis Wilkinson, he
levied upon the goods in contest as Wilkinson's property, and holds
them under that levy.
Reply in denial of the answer.
The'jury found specially, in answer to interrogatories propounded
by the court ; also a general verdict for the defendant; and the
court, having refused a new trial, rendered judgment.
The record presents these facts: On Sattirday, January 26,
1856, Wilkinson proposed to sell the goods to the plaintiff; the
terms of sale were then talked over; and on Sunday, January 27,
a bill of sale of the same goods was signed and delivered to the
plaintiff, and with it the keys of the store-room'in which the goods
were situate. The plaintiff was to pay Wilkinson $2,100 for the
goods-$1,000 of which was to be paid by the surrender of notes
for that amount then held by plaintiff against Wilkinson, and the
residue to be paid in the payment of certain specified debts which
he, Wilkinson, then owed, amounting to $1,100. On Monday,
January 28, the plaintiff opened the store, and on the next day,
Tufesday, surrendered to Wilkinson the notes, amounting to $1,000.
The plaintiff continued in possession of the-goods until the 10th of
April, 185G, when they were levied on by the defendant as sheriff, &c.
DAVIsoN,

This case will be found reported' in the 13th volume of Indiana Reports, 203,
now in press.-Ed8.Am. Law Rey.
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During the time the plaintiff so held the goods in possession,
Wilkinson was frequently present in the store-room, and saw him
dispose of various articles of the store goods, but made no objection. It was proved that the plaintiff, in addition to the surrender
of the notes, had, afterwards and before the levy, paid some of the
debts which he had agreed to pay.
The plaintiff, at the proper time, moved this instruction:
"Although a contract entered into on Sunday is void, yet if the
parties, on a proper day, affirmed the contract by complying with
its terms, it thereby became their contract on a proper day, and
binding on them."
The court refused so to instruct the jury, but instrueted as follows:
' A contract made on Sunday is absolutely void, and no subsequent ratification can give it validity."
Are these rulings, when applied to the case made by this record,
correct?
It has been often decided, that a contract entered into on Sunday is void, on the ground that it is an act of common labor, the
exercise of which on that day is forbidden by the positive provisions
of a statute. Link vs. Olemmens, 7 Blackf. 479; Reynolds vs.
Stevenson, 4 Ind. R. 619. And further, the general rule is, that
a void contract is not susceptible of ratification. The State vs.
The State Bank, 5 Ind. R. 353. Story on Agency, 240, 241.
If, then, the case before us rested on the mere fact of the sale
and delivery of the store goods on Sunday, no court would lend its
aid to enforce the contract. But there is a class of cases which
assume the position that the parties to such void contract may, on a
subsequent day, so act in reference to its performance as to ratify
it, and, in effect, make it a new contract.
Thus, in Williams vs. Paul, 6 Bing. 653 the contract was executed on Sunday, the property was retained by the defendant, and
afterwards, on another day, he promised to pay for it. The court
held that the subsequent promise was sufficient on a quantum meruit, or as a ratification of the agreement made on Sunday.
So, in Summer vs. Jones, 24 Verm. R. 317, the plaintiff, on Sun-
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day, sold a horse to the defendant, for which, on the same day, he
gave the plaintiff his note. Afterwards he made two payments on
the note, and retained the property without offering to return it.
Held, that these payments on the note, accompanied by the retention of the property, was a subsequent ratification of the contract;
and that the plaintiff was entitled to recover on the note. See,
also, Adams vs. Gay, 19 Verm. 853; Sargent vs. Butts, 21 id. 99;
Clough vs. Davis, 9 N. ilamp. 500; Smith vs. Bean, 15 id. 576.
In Adams vs. Gay, supra, the court say: " Contracts made on
Sunday should be held an exception, in some sense, from the general class of contracts which are void for illegality. They are not
tainted with any general illegality, but are illegal only as to the
time in which they are entered into. It is not sufficient, to avoid
them, that they have grown out of a transaction on the Sabbath.
And, although closed upon that day, yet, if affirmed upon another
day, they then become valid."
These decisions relate alonb to contracts made on Sunday. They
proceed on the ground of a retention of the property, and subsequent ratification by the parties ; and, in principle, they seem to be
correct. Do they apply to the case at bar?
I
Here the terms of the sale were agreed on, and the property delivered to the plaintiff on Sunday; but he retained possession until
it was levied on by the sheriff, and, in the meantime, with the assent
of the vendor, sold portions of it in the ordinary course of business ; and, in addition, on a day subsequent to the sale, paid, and
the vendor received, at least one half the consideration for which
he sold the property. This, in view of the authorities to which we
have referred, was, obviously, a ratification of the contract by the
parties; and the result is, the instruction moved by the plaintiff
should have been given, and that given must be held erroneous.
The judgment is reversed with costs. Cause remanded, &c.

ALLEN vs. PETERS.

It

the District Court of Philadelpha,March 31, 1860.
ALLEN VS. PETERS.

1. An unanswered letter, offered by the party writing it, if it be restricted to
making a demand, where this is required, or merely giving notice, is admissible
evidence; but ifit contains itatements framed for a different purpose, and such
statements derive no support from the other evidence in the cause, it is inadmissible.
2. If such letter does not go beyond demand or notice, or contain other consentaneous evidence, th6 whole may be submitted to the jury; but the court will scan
its contents rigorously, and so instruct the jury, that undue weight shall not be
given to such evidence.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
STROUD, J.-The declaration of the plaintiff contains all the
common money counts in indebitatus assumpsit, but no special
count.
The trial took place on the 1st of last February, and resulted in
a verdict for the plaintiff for $324 35.
It is not necessary to go at large into the evidence given on the
trial, inasmuch as we are all of opinion that the verdict must be set
aside, on account of misdirection, or rather of the want of full
direction, in the charge, as to the effect of a letter written by the
plaintiff to the defendant. This letter will be particularly noticed
hereafter.
It may be briefly stated, that the action was brought to recover
$300, as the price paid by the plaintiff to the defendant for a horse
-one of a pair which the defendant sold and delivered to the plaintiff. The price paid for the pair was $600, and the defendant gave
at the time a receipt for "six hundred dollars in full for one pair
of gray horses, which I warrant sound."
A few days after the purchase, one of the horses, whilst driven
alone attached to a light vehicle, took fright, and was with difficulty
restrained. At the instance of the plaintiff, this horse was taken
back by the defendant, and another horse supplied in his place.
The plaintiff alleged that this last horse was not received by him
as a substitute and permanent exchange for the horse which had
taken fright, but was a mere loan, under an agreement that it might
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be used for a while, and until another and better horse (a proper
match for the unexceptionable horse of the original pair) should be
procured by the defendant and delivered to the plaintiff.
After the lapse of five months, (in which interval the defendant
sent a horse to the plaintiff, but it was larger and less sightly than
was desired, and was at once returned,) thd plaintiff sent the horse,
which he had received in the place of the frightened one, to the
defendant, who immediately ordered the messenger to take it back
to the plaintiff. This was accordingly done.
On the 11th of April, 1859, the plaintiff wrote and sent to the'
defendant this letter:
DEAR Sia: I return to-day the horse which you loaned me until you could furnish me with another horse, for the one I purchased from-you for three hundred

dollars, and returned to you on account of his being unkind and not free from
vice, as you represented him to be.
You are hereby notified, that unless, on .orbefore April 28th inst., you either furnish me with a horse that pleases me as well as the one I now have, which I purchased from you, or a horse as valuable as the one purchased at the same time,
which I first returned to you, would have been had he been kind and free from
fault, as you represented him; in accordance with the terms of our contract, I shall
consider that you have abandoned your said contract, and I shall look to you for
repayment at once of the said sum of three hundred dollars-this being the price
I paid you" for the horse first returned on account of being unkind.

The defendant took the letter, read it before the Learer, and told
him to take the horse again to the plaintiff. The horse was immediately taken back, and still remains with him.' This letter was
offered in evidence by the plaintiff, and received and read to the
jury.
No reply was ever made to it by the defendant, except what was
orally said, directing the horse to be taken away.
In the charge, the jury were told, that if they should find, from
the evidence, that the original contract between the parties was,
that the pair of horses purchased by the plaintiff from the defendant was on a condition, that if a particular horse of the pair should
not prove to be such as the plaintiff, ititended to buy, and the defendant intended to sell, that it should be returned by the plaintiff to
the defendant, and that thereupon the defendant Would supply a suitable horse -such as plaintiff intended to buy, and defendant intended
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to sell-and if they should also find that the horse originally bought
was not such as the parties intended it should be, and that thereupon the plaintiff returned it to defendant, and defendant sent a
horse as a loan until the defendant should get and furnish to plaintiff a suitable horse, according to the original agreement, and the
defendant has never since supplied a proper horse, according to this
agreement, but has refused to do so, and the plaintiff has offered to
return the loaned horse, but defendant has refused to receive it;
that the price of the horse sold by the defendant to the plaintiff
was $300, and the same has nbt been repaid to the plaintiff, they
might, if they thought proper, give a verdict for the plaintiff. If
they should not find these facts from the evidence, they should give
the verdict for the defendant.
It may be that there was not, in all the evidence before the jury,
a sufficient warrant to find the facts named in the charge. It is
not intended here to go into that inquiry. It is quite certain, that,
excluding the letter, there were several essential facts pointed out,
to them, of which there was no evidence in what was derived orally
from witnesses.
Thus it is, in the letter only, that any thing is said, importing
that each horse was separately valued in the sale at $800; for, although the pair was bought for $600, this does not, either necessarily or even probably, imply that the parties fixed half of that sum
as the value of each. Indeed, the oral evidence showed, that, on
the very occasion of the purchase and sale, the defendant had asked,
and endeavored to obtain, $700 for the pair; that the plaintiff refused to give more than $600, saying if the defendant would get a
match for the dark-gray horse, (the one of the pair which was never
objected to,) he would give $700.
And so in regard to the fact, that the horse received by the
plaintiff from the defendant, in lieu of the 7one which had taken
fright, was merely loaned to plaintiff. This was the very hinge of
the cause, and, excluding the letter, there was no evidence of the
kind.
We are thus brought to the consideration of the questions1. Whether the unanswered letter of the plaintiff was admissible at
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all ? 2. Was not the weight given to it on the chargb improper
and unjust to the defendant ?
Upon the first of these questions, there has been, it is believed,
no authoritative decision in this State. In Roller vs. Meiner,
15 P. S. R. 244, Judge Rogers has expressed his opinion very
clearly on the subject. The- point before the court was, whether
letters written after the commencement of the suit by the plaintiff
to the defendant, and to which the defendant had given written
answers, could be given in evidence by the plaintiff. The court
below had received them as evidence, and this had been excepted to
by the defendant. In treating of this exception, Judge Rogers
said, "The letters, although written after the commencement of the
suit, are evidence, because they were responded to by the defendants. The letters were admitted as a connected whole-no objection being made to any particular part of the correspondence.
Had the defendant8 taken no notice of the plaintiff's letter, THE
EXCEPTION WOULD AVAIL HERE."

But this was extra-judicial, as

no such question was before the court; and in.Fraley vs. Biispham,
10 P. S. R. 320, where the question was, whether a quantity of
tobacco had been sold with a warranty as to quality, the plaintiffs
offered in evidence an account sent to defendant, in which the cost
and charges, and the net proceeds of the tobacco, resulted in a
loss of $1,690, accompanied with a letter from them to the defendant, in which they said, "Having received'an account of the sales
of 50 hhds. of tobacco, purchased from you last. September, .under
a guaranty that you would reimburse us for any loss *hich we might
sustain by that shipment,, we now annex a statement of our claim
for loss, amounting to -1,690, to the settlement of which we ask
your early attention." No notice was taken by the defendant of
this letter, and, after waiting a year or two, the plaintiff sent a
second letter, containing similar allegations as to the warranty of
the tobacco and its inferior quality, together with a statement -of
$1,690 as a loss to them, for which they requested payment and a
reply. The defendant made no answer to this letter. The account
and letters were offered in evidence, and rejected by the court.
This rejection was made the subject of a bill of exceptions.
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The Supreme Court sustained the ruling of the court below.
This decision would be exactly in point, had not the court placed
the rejection expressly on the ground, that the evidence was not
admissible on a count for an account stated, under which it was
specially offered. The language of the court, however, approximates
very nearly to a recognition of the principle, that the letters not having been answered, were not evidence at-all against the defendant.
There have been several cases in the English courts, in which
this question has been passed upon. In .airlie vs. Denton, 3 C. &P.
103, the plaintiff, in an action for money had and received, offered
in evidence a letter written by him to the defendant, demanding
payment of a sum of money, no answer bad been returned by the
defendant.
Lord Tenterden rejected the evidence, saying, " It is too much
to say that a man, by omitting to answer a letter, admits the truth
of the statement that letter contains."
In Richards vs. Frankum, 9 C. & P. 221, Baron Gurney, who
was then sitting at Nisi Prius, said, "What the defendant writes,
is evidence for the plaintiff; but the plaintiff cannot make evidence
for himself by his attorney writing to the defendant. 'That can be
done only for the purpose of showing either notice or a demand."
The exceptions named, make the rule a sensible one, because
notice and demand are, in the cases in which such evidence is received, positive facts, which the party is bound to prove to make
out his cause of action ; and it is of no importance whether the
other party receives them silently or gives an answer. They require, in their nature, no answer.
In Draper vs. Crofts & Bartlett, 15 M. & W. 166, this subject
was carefully discussed. The case was this: "Assumpsit for use
and occupation of a messuage. The defendant, Crofts, pleaded non
hssumpsit and payment. Bartlett suffered judgment by default.
At the trial before Baron Platt,it appeared that the plaintiff had
let the premises to the two defendants, by a written agreement, for
three years, from Lady-day, 1840, to Lady-day, 1843. Bartlett
alone actually occupied, the premises and paid the rent, and, after
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the expiration of the three years, he held over down to the year
1845.
There was no evidence of any assent of Crofts to this holding
over, and the only evidence offered- to show his knowledge of it,
was the following letter, which was written and sent him by the
plaintiff's attorney on the 2d of March, 1844:
Sin: I beg to call on you for payment of 431. 15s., remaining due from you and
Mr. Theophilus Bartlett'or rent of Mr. Draper's premises, up to Christmas last, and
I hope to-receive it next Thursday.

The defendant returned no answer to ihis letter ; and its reception in evidence was objected to on his part, on the ground that it
furnished no evidence against him. The learned judge, however,.
received it. A verdict was rendered for the plaintiff; and, on motion for a new trial, the verdict was set aside, but on a ground distinct from any objection to the letter as being unanswered.
But the admissibility of the letter was discussed by counsel, and
adverted to by the judges-Parke, B., in 'particular, dealing with
the subject at considerable length. After disposing of the main
question in the case, he said: "With respect to the letter, it seems
to me that Crofts, who stood at that time in the situation of a mere
stranger, was not bound to return any answer to the demand for
rent. Whether it was strictly admissible or not, it is hardly necessary to say. There was a difference between the late Lord Abiner and the other members of the court on this very point.. The
Lord Chief Baron (Abinger) thought that a letter, such as this, was not admissible at all; others, that it was admissible, but not worth
any thing when admitted. My own opinion is, that no attentioh
at all need be paid to a letter asking for money which the party
does not owe. It is a different case, if he is bound by circumstances
or by his situation, to return an answer. I think, therefore, not
-,that such evidence is absolutely inadmissible, but that it is worth
very little when admitted."
-1
Drapervs. Crofts, was decided in 1846. A later case, decided
in the Queen's Bench in 1850, is reported in 14 Queen's Bench
Rep. 664, as qaskill vs. Skene.
T his was assumpsit for money had and received.
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On the trial before Lord Denman, C. J., it appeared that a Mr.
Dobie had been employed to compound with the plaintiff's creditors
by paying each of them 10s. in the pound, and that he had paid
defendant 261. 2s. 6d. as 10s. in the pound on a debt of 521. 5s.
Subsequently, Mr. Price, who was employed as accountant for the
plaintiff's estate, wrote four letters to the defendant, to which he
received no answer.
The plaintiff's counsel, having called for these letters, which were
not produced, offered secondary evidence of their contents. The
defendant's counsel objected that they could not be evidence unless
it were shown tlhat the defendant, in some way, acted upon them.
The Lord Chief Justice received the evidence. The first letter was
as follows:

December 3, 1846.
Mr. Dobie has handed me your letter of the 26th May last, acknowledging the
receipt of check for 261. 2s. 6d., being 10s. in the pound on your former account
of 521. 5s. against MIr Gaskill, and also enclosing another account for 41. 53. 6d.,
which latter claim not being included in my list of liabilities, he requested me, as
accountant to the estate, to examine and arrange with you. I find this latter account correct in every respect; but, with regard to the former account, have just
discovered, that, through an oversight, it was sent to Mr. Dobie as being unpaid,
although I now find it was settled by Mr. Gaskill himself, in October last year,
in full by a check for 391. 10s., which was never returned to Mr. G.'s clerk in the
cash account, and was not, consequently, posted to your debit in the ledger, and
therefore included in the list of creditors. You will be good enough, therefore, to
look to your cash account of that date, (October, 1845,) where you will find my
statements correct, and I shall be happy to hear from you on the subject per return; and, if you will oblige me with the name of your London agent, I shall be
happy to wait on him with the receipts for both payments, and we can then come
to an arrangement as to the account for the 41. 5s. 6d.

The other letters referred to this, and complained that no answer
was given. There was also evidence of a conversation with the
defendant, in which he acknowledged that he had received the
check for 391. 10s., but said he had agreed to take off only 5 per
cent. discount from the 521. 5s., and had received the check on account of the balance, and not in discharge of the whole. A receipt
for 471., signed by the defendant, was put in ; but the sum of 471.
was written on an erasure, and it was not explained, on any hypothesis, how that sum was come to.
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The Lord Chief Justice, in summing up, told the jury that the
letters were not evidence of the truth of the statements contained
in them; but that the silehce of the defendant, after receiving such
letters, was a fact from which they might draw an inference. He
left it to the jury to find for the plaintiff or defendant, according
as they thought that the debt of 521. 5s. had or had not been discharged before the payment by Mr. Dobie.
The verdict was for the plaintiff.
A rule fi8i for'a new trial wag obtained, on the grounds of the
improper reception of evidence and of misdirection.
This rule was, after fuV argument in banec, discharged. All the
judges were present, except Lord Denman, who was absent on
account of ill health.
This is a very important cage, as it involved the two questionsfirst, of the admissibility of the letters in evidence ; and secofid,
of the proper directions to the jury.
Three of the four judges who sat at the argument, gave thei
opinions on both-points-a coiicurrirg in the propriety of.the rulingis to the receptioi of the letters in evidence, and also in approvalt oft
the dir6etions to the jury.

As to the- letters,. the opinion expressed was, that a letter, tAougk.
unanswered, was evidence ot. a demawnd by the 1Plffnfiff, '",hiawit
was proper in him to Inake; and that to mak6 a dem hid inidlg''.
it was generally necessary to giVe soine statement'of fats.on
Gwhick
the demand was made,-and that the letters received ih&ridorn did
not go further-than was requisite fbr that purpose."
We think this decision places the subject on its #ruegraudS;-&ndthIY
result of the whole of the cases seems to be; that an unaawered iletter
6ffered by the party by or for whom it was written, if it be restricted to.
making a demdzd where this is requisite, or giving a aiotide merely
is always admissible; that, if it contain statdments.oi a.different
nature, and evidently framed for a different .purpose-f. and "thse.drive no support from other evidence in the cause, itshould be wholly
excluded; but, if the statements do not go beyond what is necessary to render the demand or notice intelligiblevr there is other
consentaneous evidence, tE - whole may be s.bumitted to the con28

ALLEN vs. PETERS.

sideration of the jury. But that it is the duty of the court, whenever such a letter is received, to scan its contents rigorously, and
make such discriminating observations to the jury, that they may
be prevented from giving undue weight to what has been so written.
The letter of the plaintiff to the defendant of 11th April, 1859,
besides the offer of the return of the horse, which was proper in
itself, but not necessary in this particular case, inasmuch as an oral
offer of the same kind had been previously made, and was in evidence, states, with more or less distinctness, these several facts :
1st. That the price paid for the returned horse which had taken
fright, was -$800 ; 2d. That the horse taken in its place was given
and received as a loan merely, and for a well understood purpose ;
and 3d. That the reason .of the return of the one horse and the
temporary substitution of the other was, that, in the bargain and
sale of the pair, the parties had agreed that the horses, besides
being sound, for which there was a written warranty, should be
"kind and free from fault."
With respect to the first of these statements, we have already
remarked, that it had no other warrant but the fact that double the
sum named had been paid for the pair; whilst the oral evidence of
what occurred at the time when the contract was made, was inconsistent with this inference. The only evidence as to the loan of
the horse, was the fact that another horse had been sent by defendant to the plaintiff shortly after the substitution ; and a proposition,
in respect to a further effort similar in object, was spoken of by one
of the witnesses. But this had nothing definite in it, and was susceptible of an opposite construction. As to the understanding that
the horses should be free from fault, the written warranty of soundness, and nothing more, affords so strong an implication that the
plaintiff trusted to the full trial which he had made of the horses
before the purchase, and had stipulated for :nothing else, that the
indistinct allusions in the letter must be regarded as standing without any collateral support.
It is not necessary to decide whether or not the letter of the 11th of
April, 1859, was properly admitted, but we hold that the charge was
defective in not directing the attention of the jury to the weakness, not
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to say insufficiency, of the statements, which have been indicated as a
groundwork of a verdict for the plaintiff. It may be that, on anothei trial, the plaintiff may be able to supply what we deem defective in his oral evidence on this -occasion, and that proper observations may then be made in the charge, and the result, what-ever it may be, prove altogether satisfactory.
As it is, we have no other course left but to set the verdict aside
and grant a new'trial. Rule absolute.

In the!Yaprem Court of Icwa, December Term, 1859.-D Eiquity.
"000K AND SARGENT, APPELLANTS, Vs. JOHN F. DILLON, SPIER WHITAKER,
ASA BHIGGS"AND ALEX. H. BARROW.

1 Where-land is conveyed to a trustee, to secure payment of a promissory note made
by the granter, with power to the trustee, on failure to pay the note when duzS)
to sell the land, and out or the proceeds to pay the note, and pay over the surplus,
If any, to the grantor, judgments recovered against the grantor after the conveyanee and before sale of the laud by the trustee, being liens upon the granters
interest in the land, and in equity, liens upon the surplus proceeds of tie land in
the hands of the trustee, after sale by him.
2-But iii such case, whore the judgments were of the same date, and one judgment
creditor issued execution and garnisheed the fund in the hands of the trustee,
beotre the other judgment creditors hal taken any iteps to assert-their lien: Hdd,
that he thereby acquired a prior right to the fund.
3. And when one of the judgment creditors became the purchaser of the laud at the
sale of tke trustee, for a price exceeding the debt secured by the deed of trust;
,Ordd that such parcliaser could not ait-off his judgment against such surplus, so
as to defeat the claim of another jpdgment creditor who had garnisheed the trustee
under execution on his judgmeot, although ach surplus had not in fact been paidover to the trustee by the purchaser.
4. As between judgment creditors whose judgments are of the same date, the one
who-first takes stbps to enforce his judgment against property, whether real or
personal, subject to the Hen of the judgments, acqpires a priority as to such
property.

On the 2d of April, 1857, the defendant Barrow, by deed of that
date, conveyed to the defendant Dillon, as trustee, certain real estate
in trust, to secure the payment of certain promissory notes made by,
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Barrow, and authorized the trustee, in case of non-payment of either
of said notes when due, to sell said real estate at public auction,
(having first given due notice by advertisement) and out of the proceeds of such sale to pay the amount due on said notes, with costs
and expenses of sale, and the surplus, if any, to pay over to Barrow,
or his representatives.
On the 19th of November, 1858, certain judgments were rendered
in the District Court of Scott County, (in which county the land
conveyed by the deed of trust was situate,) against the firm of
Chubb, Brother, Barrow & Co., in which the defendant Barrow was
a partner. Two of these judgments were in favor of Cook and
Sargent, the plaintiffs, for the aggregate amouiit of $9,000. Another
was in favor of the defendant Whitaker for 81,963, and another in
fav-or of the defendant Briggs, for $957.
On the 31st day of December, 1858, one of the notes secured by
the deed of trust being due and unpaid, Dillon the trustee, having
given due notice, sold the land conveyed by the deed of trust at
public auction, to Cook and Sargent the plaintiffs, for the sum of
$2,200, which exceeded the amount necessary to pay the debt
secured by the deed of trust and the exipenses of sale, by the sum
of $1,057 75. Immediately after the sale, notices of garnishment
were served by the sheriff upon Dillon the trustee, under executions
previously issued upon the said judgment in favor of Whitaker and
Briggs, notifying Dillon not to pay over to Barrow any money
belonging to him, which might be, or come into the trustee's hands.
Cook and Sargent thereupon filed this bill in equity, in which
they allege the above facts, and claim that the said judgments were
liens upon Barrow's interest in the land prior to the sale by the
trustee, and that upon the sale, said lien attached upon the surplus
proceeds of the land, after satisfying the debt secured by the deed
of trust, and that said judgments being all of the same date, said
surplus ought to be applied upon them all pro rata. They further
allege that they are ready and willing, and have offered to pay to
the trustee the sum of $2,200 bid by them, on condition that said
trustee would retain in his hands the proportion of said surplus to
which they were entitled by virtue of their judgments, until the
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rights of the parties claiming to be entitled thereto are ascertained
and settled, and upon such offer have demanded a deed of the land
from the trustee, who refuses to execute the same, except upon tWe
unconditional payment by plaintiffs of said sum of $2,200, and
refuses to retain plaintiffs' proportionable share of said surplus.
They pray the court to determine in what manner said surplus
should be applied, and to decree a conveyance of the land, on the
payment by them of the amount bid, according to the order and
decree of the court.
The defendants Whitaker and Briggs' answered, claiming thl
whole of the surplus by virtue of their garnishment of the trustee.
They make their answer a cross-bill, and pray that the plaintiffs
may be ordered to bring the money into court, and that it bd paid
over to them. "
The District Court, on a hearing, decreed that the plaintiffs pay
the surplus money into court, for the use'of Whitaker and Briggs,
and that on such payment, the trustee - convey the land to the
.plaintiffs.
From this decree, plaintiffs appeal.
John lV. Rogers, for appellants.
S. Whitaker and J. Grant, for respondents.
STOOKTON, J.-By the conveyance from Barrow to Dillon, the
legal title of -the grantor in the real estate passed to Dillon the
trustee, subject to be- defeated on the payment of the money by
Barrow, in accordance with the terms of the deed oftrust.
Barrow retained only a right to redeem, and upon this interest
the judgmonts in favor of Cook and Sargent, Whitaker, and Briggs,
wer" liens. Our statute has made judgments in the Supreme or

District Courts liens upon all interests in real estate, legal and
equitable.' Code, sections 2485, 26.
Upon further examination-of the authoriies, since the petition
for a rehearing was filed, we are of opinion that this equitable
interest of Barrow in the land is represented by the surplus in the
hands of the trustee after the sale by hin to satisfy the debt secured
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by the deed of trust, and that the lien of the judgment is continued
in respect to this surplus.
The lien of the judgments does not attach to the land in the hands
of the purchaser after a sale by the trustee, and he takes the same
unaffected by such liens. But as the surplus proceeds, after discharging the debt secured by the deed of trust, stand in the place
of the debtor's right of redemption, and represent that right, the
lien of the judgments upon the right of redemption may in equity
be enforced against the surplus in the hands of the trustee.
The judgments, then, of the complainants Cook and Sargent, and
of the defendants Whitaker and Briggs, were equal liens upon the
surplus in the hands of Dillon, and it devolved the duty upon them
of taking some step to have the fund appropriated to the payment
of theirjudgments. If some steps were not taken, and some notice
not given to Dillon of these judgments, and of the lien thereof upon
the money of Barrow in his hands, lie would have been without fault
and without liability, if he had paid it over to Barrow. It does not
result that the trustee is to make search and inquiry whether there
are any liens upon the money in his hands. It devolves upon the
parties claiming to bold such liens, to give notice of them, and to
enforce them at the earliest practicable moment.
There can be no question but that the surplus money in the
hands of the trustee, after satisfying the deed of trust, was the
personal property of Barrow, liable, as any other property of the
owner, to be seized in execution for the payment of his debts. If
tl-e jurisdiction of a court of equity had first attached, for the purpose of enforcing the lien of complainants' judgment, or of distributing the proceeds of Barrow's interest in the land among those
of his creditors having equal liens, such jurisdiction would not have
been ousted by any subsequent proceeding in garnishment against
Dillon, to subject the money in his hands to the payment of judgments against Barrow. That court would have proceeded to enforce its jurisdiction first acquired, by directing Dillon to pay out
the money in his hands in satisfaction, so far as it would go, of the
liens existing against the fund in his hands.
But no step of this kind was taken by the complaintants until
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the 14th January, 1859, more than two weeks after the sale by the
trusfee, and after the money in contemplation of law was in his
hands. In the meantime, the defendants, Whitaker and Briggs, on
the day of the sale by the trustee, as soon as they ascertained that
the land sold for more than was sufficient to satisfy the amount due
6n the deed* of trust, garnisheed by due process of law the surplus amount in the hands of the trustee. This proceedipg was,
under our -statute, a'seizure of and levy upon the money in the
hands of Dillon at the day of the sale, and. effectually bound the
amount in the hands of Dillon fro% that time. It was a mode fixed
and appointed by lawr, by which the property and estate of Barrow
in thesurplus money in Dillon's hands might lib appropriated' to
the payment of any judgment against him. Dillon, in-reply t6 the
garnishee process, in addition to his answer, that he had so 3huch
-money of the defendant Barrow in -his hands, might state how it
came into his hands, and the nature of claim by the complainants,
by virtue of their judgment. But this judgment and lien could be
no bar to the right'of the other creditors- by virtue of their garnishee process, to have the amount in the hifids of the-trustee first
applied in payment of their claims, by reason: of their having .fiit
seized the same.'
As between judgment creditors whose liens are of thd seine date,
he who first takes the property in execution, has the preferenice to,
*be first paid out of its proceeds. And this is the rule, whether the
property be real or personal estate, or chbses in action not subject
"o actual or manual seiihre, and which, by our 8tattite, are taken
and -seized only by garnishment. Adams vs. ZDyer, 8 Johns. 34T;
"'Watermanvs. Haskin, 11 ib. 228 ; Burney vs. Boyett, 1 How.
Miss. 89.
The law favors the diligent creditor, anda will suffer no interference by one who has slept on his rights, -for the purpo'se of
taking from him the fruits of his superior diligence. The levy by
the sheriff, under the writs of execution on the judgments of Whitaker and Briggs) was a seizure and appropriation of the money in Dillon's hands, and the subsequent filing of a bill in equity by the
complainants, could not take away the privity thus acquired.
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We have said that, in contemplation of law, the surplus money,
after satisfying the deed of trust, is in Dillon's hands. He had the
right to require that the whole amount bid by the complainants for
the land at the sale should be paid to him. Until it is so paid to
him, the complainants have no standing in court. They have no
right to say that they hold the amount bid by them -at the sale in
their hands, ready to pay the same to the trustee, provided and on
condition that he will consent to retain the surplus in his hands,
until the rights of the complainants thereto, or to a portion of the
same, can be determined. The trustee could well demand that the
whole amount bid by complainants for the land, should be paid before executing a deed for the land.
It results from these ,considerations, that the complainhnts have
no -valid claim to set-off their judgment against Barrow against any
portion of the amount due from them on their bid to the trustee.
The complainants and Barrow stand in no such relation tb each
other, as that the right of set-off can arise. The legal title to the
land was in Dillon, and it was with him they were dealing, not with
Barrow. Their rights as purchasers only arise on the payment of
the purchase money, and they could not claim, as they do in their
petition, to have a conveyance from the trustee, and at the same
time the right to hold on to the money in their hands, on an assumed right to set-off their judgment against Barrow against the
surplus conjectured to be remaining in Dillon's hands, after satisfying the amount due on the trust deed. We may add, that this claim
on the part of the complainants has only been made on the argument, and is not set up in their petition. They therein expressly
claim that the judgments recovered against Barrow are all liens
upon the surplus in the hands of the trustee, and pray tLz the
same may be applied in payment of the said judgments pro rata.
The decree of the District Court is affirmed.
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In the Supreme Court ofIowa, December Term, 1859.LUNSFORD

n Equity.

L. LORING vS. CHARLES W. PAIRO, WILLIAM'NOURSE ANIV
SAMUEL C. kDES.

1. A general assignment for the benefit of creditors, with preferences among the
creditors, made by insolvent debtors not residents of this State, at their places
of residence, and conveying land situated in this State, is void as respects such
land, under section 977 of the Code of Iowa, which provides that "no general
assignment of property by su insolvent or in contemplation of insolveihcy, for the
benefit of creditors, shall be valid, unless it be made for the benefit of all his
creditors, in proportion to the amount of theft! respective claims ;" notwithstanding that such assignment may be valid by the law of the place where it 'was
made.
2. The validity of a conveyande of real estate must be determined by the ezx
loc(
rei sitm.
3. The judgment of z court of general jurisdiction must be presumed to be valid,
until the contrary is shown.
A In a bill in equity by a judgment creditor to set aside a conveyance of property
by the judgment debtor, as void, and to subject iuch property to execution on
the judgment, it is not necessary to be shown that the- complainant 'has issued
an execution on his judgment, and had itreturned nulla bona.
•
5. The rule of equity, that partnership creditors shall have a preference as to
partnership' property, and separate creditors as to separate property, has no
application to a suit in equlty b-y a judgmient creditor of the firm, against the
judgment debtors, ind their assignee, to set iside a v6id an assignment of prperty belonging to one of the partners, and to establish the Hen of the complainhut's judgment thereon.'
. .

This was a bill in equity, brought by the complainant, as a judgment creditor of the defendants, Pairo and Nourse, to set aside a
general assignment for the benefit 'of creditors, -with preferences,
and a deed auxiliary thbreto, made by Pairo and'Nourse to the
defendant Edes, so far as said .deeds purported to convey certain
lauds in Muscatine Comity, Iowa. The District Court of Muscatine County rendered a decree in favor of complainant, from which
respondents appeal.
.
The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.
Richmond and Bro., for appellants.
Gusrley and Rogers, for appellee.
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WRIGHT, CH. J.-Pairo and Nourse were bankers in Washington
city. The bill charges that on the 14th of September, 1857, they
were insolvent, and being so, they executed to their co-respondent
Edes a deed of general assignment of their property, real and personal, for the benefit of their creditors. It is also averred that
Pairo, one of the co-partners, on the same day, being the owner in
fee simple of certain lands in Muscatine county, in this State, conveyed the same to said Edes, in trust for the partnership creditors;
that both of said deeds were executed on the same day, and in
pursuance of the same plan and design, to wit, to convey all their
property, of whatever nature and wherever situate, to secure their
creditors; that the deed of Pairo was in aid of the one made by the
partnership, and for the purpose of more specifically conveying,.by
a particular description, the said land.
Complainant avers that on the same day he deposited with Pairo
and Nourse near $2,400, for which he received a certificate of deposit; that on the 7th of October, 1857, he procured an attachment
against them from the Muscatine District Court; that the same was
levied upon the land conveyed by Pairo to Edes, and that such
proceedings were afterwards had, that on the 19th of October,
1858, he recovered a judgment against the said Pairo and Nourse,
for the amount of his said debt, with interest. It is then alleged
that said two deeds, so far as they purport to convey the title to
said land in Muscatine county, are null and void; that the attachment and judgment are liens upon said land, and that said deeds
are a cloud upon the title, and an obstruction and hindrance in the
way of enforcing said liens. This cloud he seeks to have removed,
and that said deeds as to said lands may be set aside.
The answers admit the execution of the deeds, but deny the insolvency, stating that "they were unable to meet their engagements, but always considered that the property conveyed, if judiciously disposed of, would not only pay all their debts, but leave a
large surplus." They admit the issuing of the certificate of deposit; state that they, as well as said plaintiff, are non-residents of
this State; admit the issuing of the attachment charged ; deny,
upon informatioin and belief, that complainant obtained a judgment,
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but refer to said proceedings for greater certainty; insist that said
deeds are not null and void, and deny the complainant's lien.
Copies of the deeds referred to are annexed to the bill, and from
them it appears that they were executed in the District of Columbia,
and were intended to convey all the estate, personal and real, of
said firm and each member thereof, to be applied to the satisfaction
of all their and each of their debts. The first deed describes certain
real estate, and then conveys " also all other lands, &c., owned by
them or either of them, in the several States and Territories following," (naming several States, including Iowa.) It also recites that
Pairo holds in his own name, divers lands, but that the same belong
to the firm.
The second deed directs the trustee to apply the proceeds of said
lands, first to the payment of certain debts which are named,- (and
some of them beink the same as named in the first,) and the remainder unto and among all 'the other creditors of Pairo &Nourse
equally, according to the amount of their respective debts.
Upon these facts, and others to be hereafter stated, complainant
insists that these deeds are invalid, and that the lands attached are
subject to his judgment; while respondents ixisist that the decree
was unwarranted, and should be reversed. Their respective positioi
ye proceed briefly to notice.
We think it very evident that these deeds constitute but one
transaction, but one general assignment. - The sebond is but in aid
of the first, the design manifestly being to carry out the plan and
object expressed in the principal instrument. And this conclusion
is not only justified by the entire tenor of the two instruments, but
by the consideration that'the bill charges these facts, and the answer
does not pretend to denythem. On the contrary, the answer. seems
to'treat them as parts of one entire transaction, and to assume it
*as true, that if one falls, the *other must. And that this is correct,
we entertain no doubt.
That this assignment, upon its face, is general, and made so as
to prefer certain creditors, is admitted. And while respondents
concede, that under the laws of this State such an assignment is
not valid, yet it is contended that it is valid by the law of the place
where made, and is therefore valid here.
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Whatever may be the rule as to such conveyances, when they
relate alone to personal property, we think it is well settled that
when they operate upon real estate, they must be judged of by the
law of the place where the real estate is situated. As transfers of
real estate, their validity must be determined by the lex loci rei
sitw. All the authorities, both in England and this country, it is
believed, recognize this principle. (Story's Confl. of Laws, §§ 427,
428, 423, a, and cases cited in note 3, to § 428.)
Our law provides that no general assignment of property by an
insolvent or in contemplation of insolvency, for the benefit of creditors, shall le valid, unless made for the benefit of all the creditors,
in proportion to the amount of their respective debts. (Code, § 977,
.Burrowsvs. Lehndorf, June Term, 1859.) Testing the assignment
in this case by the rule of the code, it is invalid. Whether it is
invalid for all purposes and every where, we need not determine.
The laws of the District of Columbia have no extra-territorial force
except by consent or comity. If the assignment was valid as to
all or any portion of the estate there, this State has adopted a
different rule, and by this we are to be governed. And being
invalid, it could not operate to pass the estate as against the creditor.
The preference to creditors renders it void; and the courts will
not undertake to strike out this part, and uphold the conveyancq
as one for the benefit of all the creditors in proportion to the amount
of their respective claims. If the assignment is valid, as claimed,
when executed, then it would follow that it might be enforced there,
so as to give the proposed preference; while here, (if the instrument
is to be sustained in part,) the same preference would be denied.
And then if the clause giving the preference can be disregarded, and
the assignment be sustained in this instance, so it may in every other
case of a like character, whether made within or without the State,
and the statute referred to would be without force or meaning.
. Respondents insist, however, that there is nothing to show that
the assignors were insolvent. Whether so in fact, in the sense
that their property was insufficient to pay their debts, we think it
most manifest from the assignment, that it was at least made in eontemplation of insolvency. If so, the rule is the same as if there
was actual insolvency.
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But it is insisted that complainant has no judgment upon which
lie could ask an execution, and therefore had no right to seek to
remove the cloud from the title to this land. The argument is, th~A
Pairo and Nourse were non-residents; that the court had no jurisdiction except over the property attached, that the complainant' could
as a consequence recover no more than a judgment against that
property, and therefore he cannot now--ask execution as upon a
general judgment; The argument is based, if not upoi a mistake
of law, at least upon one of fact.-. Though defendants were not
residents of the State,. it by no mbans - follows that 'they may not
have appeared to the action, submitted to the jurisdiction, and -thus
have ronferred upon the .court power to render a general judgment.
The bill charges that such proeeeags were had, so that complaii
ant recoveed judgment against said Pairo and' Nourse, and this is
nowhere positively denied..
If a judgment was recovered, we. must presume, in'the absence of
proof to The contrary,'that it was a valid judgment. Thus viewing
the case, we need not stop to inquire whether -the legal proposition
asserted by respomdent, -upon' the,-- pposition that there was no
appearance to the attachment proceedingsi, is correct or not.
It is further insisted, that before complainant could proceed in
equity to snbjcct the lands, he should have had an execution returned
iulla Una; in othei words, he should show that he had exhausted
his legal,remedy, before going into .e!iity., Tothis' we think ca,
.plainant well answdrs,:that tis is not "a creditor'6 Will:,to reach.
eqaitahle. assets upgn wichthe
,
njudgment is not a liebil but to'xemiov
gut of -the way-of an execution apretended iouveyance, which is
alleged to .be.void.

.
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To the lartter, it is not secehary for thepartyto exlaust his legal,
remedies in his effort to obtaintsetisfaction of -his judgment. Beck
vs. B urditt, 1 Paige, 305, and cases there cited.
It is farther'insisted, that the lands attachied belonged to Pairo ;"
that by'the'second deed these lands were devoted first to the paymeat f his individual debts; that complainant is a creditor of the

firm, and therefore has no'Tight to seek to subject the property of
the individual member to his debt.

